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INTRODUCTION
The Corporate Laws Amendment Bill (the Bill), published in GG 28765 of
21 April 2006, was introduced in Parliament on 8 May 2006. It heralds a new
era in South African company law and comprises the first phase of a sweeping
corporate law-reform process initiated by the Department of Trade and
Industry (DTI). The impetus for this project apparently originated as far back
as November 1997, when the DTI issued a document outlining a broad
legislative reform programme that included a review of existing securities
regulations, institutions with principal oversight of corporate structure, and
current practices and regulations in the area of corporate governance.
As a precursor to the corporate law-reform phase of the broader legislative
reform programme, the DTI published a document entitled South African
Company Law for the 21st Century: Guidelines for Corporate Law Reform in GN
1183 GG 26493 of 23 June 2004 (the Proposal). The Proposal sets out, in
general terms, those changes which the DTI deems necessary or desirable to
its effort to review and modernize South African company law. This is based
on a perceived need to bring our law into line with international trends and,
according to the DTI, to reflect and accommodate the changing business
environment, both nationally and internationally.
It is important to note at the outset that the Proposal envisages that the
drafting of, and publication and consultation on, the new company law is to
take place in two stages. These are an interim review of the Companies Act
61 of 1973 to deal with problematic provisions which require urgent
legislative attention, a process that has now culminated in the Bill; followed
by a further, more comprehensive process of drafting, publication and
consultation to deal with the remainder of the changes required to bring
company legislation as a whole into line with the DTI’s philosophy as set out
in the Proposal. (In what follows the first stage is referred to as the Interim
Phase, which is to be completed by mid–2006, and the latter as the Final
Phase, to be completed by the end of 2006.) This placed the drafters of the
Bill in an invidious position. They were required to deal with certain
substantive problem areas of company law in sufficient detail to address
current difficulties, but could not exceed their mandate in this regard because
issues flowing from or tangential to the urgent amendments in the Interim
Phase must, in the interests of expediting the legislative procedure, remain
reserved for the Final Phase. As is pointed out later in this note, the resulting
tightrope act required of the drafters has resulted in some drafting anomalies
and ambiguities and, consequently, some uncertainty.
A CLOSER LOOK AT SOME SPECIFIC AMENDMENTS
Definition of ‘public interest company’ and ‘limited interest company’
One of the principal changes to the Companies Act is to be found in the
amendment of s 1 by the insertion of two new definitions. A new subsec (6)
defines a ‘public interest company’ and a ‘limited interest company’
respectively. This definition is the very cornerstone of one of the primary
objectives of the corporate law-reform process as expressed by the DTI in
the Proposal, since the definitions form the legislative basis for distinguishing
between these two types of companies as part of an overarching process of
replacing all existing company forms (public and private companies and
apparently, in the fullness of time, close corporations) with one simple,
flexible choice of business vehicle. The stated philosophy of the DTI in this
regard is that it is necessary to move away from the ‘largely artificial’
separation between the different business forms, to recognize only one form
of business vehicle and to provide for a simple, easy company formation
process.
In chapter 4 of the Proposal it is suggested that company law should set out
mandatory provisions for all companies and provide optional provisions and
default provisions in cases where the entity involved does not make an
election. The articles and memorandum of the company should provide for
mandatory rules and could allow shareholders to create additional optional
requirements. Furthermore, the DTI envisages a regime in which sharehold-
ers may opt out of certain mandatory rules if a large majority, for example 90
per cent, agree to do so. According to the DTI it is further important to
recognize that companies vary in size, turnover and with respect to the
number of shareholders, but that the number of shareholders does not
provide an adequate basis for differentiation and that the most important
distinction is between listed and unlisted entities. A further distinction may
apparently be necessary for unlisted companies on the basis of turnover, since
the ability of the company to contract and establish relationships with other
stakeholders becomes more important and complex as the size and turnover
of the company increase. It is further proposed that a company should have a
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broad purpose, which would be to do business or to operate ‘not for profit’,
and this will be afforded specific attention in the reform process. It appears,
therefore, that the distinction between public and limited interest companies
has been drawn to facilitate this new approach. In addition, different sets of
reporting standards will exist for and apply to public interest companies and
limited interest companies, the former being more comprehensive and more
onerous than the latter. In the same vein, audit committees are required to be
appointed in relation to public interest companies while this is not necessary
in the case of a limited interest company. This illustrates the legislative
approach to be adopted going forward: public interest companies (given
inter alia the complexity of the consequences of their interaction with
stakeholders other than shareholders) are to be burdened with more onerous
standards, requirements and obligations than are limited interest companies,
which affect a smaller number of people and affect them to a lesser extent.
This being the case, it is obviously essential that the relevant definitions are
clear, sufficient and watertight as they underpin the two-tier financial and
regulatory regime to be implemented.
It may be useful to point out at this stage that, by virtue of the definitions
that have been attached to public and limited interest companies respectively,
the Bill has apparently created at least two different types of formal business
vehicle as opposed to the single business vehicle originally intended.
Furthermore, one may find that as the differentiation between the two forms
is fleshed out with respect to mandatory and optional requirements and the
different reporting standards and other obligations crystallize, various types
of business vehicle will appear within the two distinct forms so that one
inevitably ends up with a number of entities, not so very different from those
encountered within the system that is currently in place. This illustrates the
drafters’ dilemma: the Bill needs to distinguish sufficiently between the
different entities to allocate to each the financial reporting obligations set out
in it, but the drafters did not have the scope to distinguish between the
different entities on all fronts and to address all the consequences of the
distinction, as these will presumably be actioned in the Final Phase
amendments. The difficulties inherent in this approach become apparent if
one considers specific provisions in the Bill.
The definition of ‘public interest company’ contained in the Bill reveals
that a company is a public interest company if (a) its articles provide for an
unrestricted transfer of its shares; (b) it is permitted by its articles to offer
shares to the public; (c) it decides by special resolution to be a public interest
company; or (d) it is a subsidiary of any of the companies described in (a) to
(c) above. Furthermore, a company with two or more types or classes of
shares is a public interest company if its articles provide for the unrestricted
transfer of shares in one or more of these types or classes. The new definition
goes on to state that, for purposes of the subsection, a transfer of shares will be
unrestricted if it is not subject to an effective right of pre-emption. An
effective right of pre-emption, in turn, is defined as a right of pre-emption
which operates in favour of all shareholders of the company and upon every
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proposed sale of shares to a person who is not a shareholder of the company.
Finally, the subsection provides a default definition for a limited interest
company: a company is a limited interest company if it is not a public interest
company.
From this portion of the new definition alone certain questions arise. The
methodology adopted in the definition of a public interest company is the
mirror image of that currently utilized in the Companies Act to regulate
private companies. To illustrate, s 20 of the Companies Act states that a
private company means a company which by its articles (a) restricts the right
to transfer of its shares; and (b) limits the number of its members to fifty; and
(c) prohibits any offer to the public for the subscription of any shares or
debentures of the company. Save for the limit on the number of members, it
seems that the approach of the DTI envisages that articles of a (new) public
interest company should contain provisions which, in relation to the
transferability of its shares and offers to the public, provide precisely the
opposite of what the articles of an (old) private company must currently
contain. However, in its current form the Bill does not necessarily produce
this result.
Section 20(3) of the Companies Act clearly enjoins a private company to
ensure that its articles continue to contain these provisions by prohibiting it
from altering the articles so as to exclude any of them, unless the company is
at the same time converted into a public company. Also, in terms of s 20(4) of
the Companies Act it is clear what the consequences are should a private
company fail to comply with these provisions, as it becomes subject to
certain sections of the Act as if it were public company. This is simulta-
neously the remedy that will address any possible mischief or prejudice
should a private company behave like a public company notwithstanding
that its articles and legal nature do not permit this.
However, the same cannot be said for the new definition. First, while
s 20(3) acts as a type of prescriptive device, there is no corresponding section
in the new ‘mirror-image’ definition, ie nothing that enjoins a public interest
company to include the relevant provisions in its articles, nor any indication
of what the consequences are if it does not do so. To illustrate, if one assumes
that the articles of a public company are silent in relation to the transferability
of its shares and are similarly silent on the offer of its shares to the public as
from the date of its incorporation (or that it amends its articles to this effect
subsequent to incorporation), does this mean that it does not qualify as a
public interest company and is therefore (by default) a limited interest
company in terms of the new subsec (6)(d)? If this is the case, it will be
relatively simple for a company to avail itself of less onerous reporting
requirements and any other less taxing obligations which apply to limited
interest companies by omitting any mention of the transfer of shares from its
articles. In its present form there is nothing in the Bill to prevent a company
which is (in fact, but not by definition) a public interest company from doing
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this. In addition, if this is the case, nothing seems to prevent a public
company, notwithstanding the fact that its articles are silent on the matter,
from then offering its shares to the public, as the sanction utilized in the
Companies Act (which treats a company as a public company by virtue of its
behaviour) has not been duplicated here. There is also no provision stating
that where a company, as contemplated by the new subsec (6)(a)(iii), decides
by special resolution to be a public interest company, it has to amend its
articles accordingly.
One could, of course, argue that as a matter of interpretation the words ‘is
permitted by its articles to offer shares to the public’ cater for the situation
where the articles of a public company are silent on the topic, and the fact
that it does not prohibit offers to the public implies that it may offer shares to
the public. However, this is a tenuous construction which the drafters could
easily have addressed by using an alternative construction such as ‘its articles
provide that it is permitted offer shares to the public’. It also does not sit well
with the ‘default’ nature of the definition of ‘limited interest company’. As
there is nothing in the Bill which stipulates that the articles of a limited
interest company must prohibit it from offering shares to the public (or
indeed any indication of what the articles of a limited interest company must
contain), the distinction between the two types of companies becomes
blurred and uncertain where the articles are silent on this point. Note further
in this regard that, while s 20 of the Companies Act requires a private
company to incorporate all three provisions in its articles (ie they are
cumulative requirements, separated by the word ‘and’), the definition in the
Bill envisages that the inclusion of either of the provisions relating to
unrestricted transfer or public offers will suffice to establish it as a public
interest company: it uses the word ‘or’ at the end of the list of items and the
list also includes the decision of a company to become a public interest
company, which is clearly a stand-alone determinant. Presumably this
drafting approach is aimed at casting the net as widely as possible so that if, for
example, the articles of a company permit it to offer shares to the public but
contain no pre-emptive rights provisions, it will still qualify as a public
interest company. This may help to provide a rationale for the way in which
the new definition is drafted, but does not assist with the ambiguities that
arise from that drafting.
Of course, the concerns raised above are based on the assumption that the
current s 20, which deals with the requirements of a private company and
cessation of its privileges in certain circumstances, will be deleted from the
Act in the Final Phase amendment by virtue of the fact that the ultimate
intention of the drafters is apparently to replace entirely the existing
distinction between public and private companies with one type of statutory
vehicle (differing only with respect to its obligations depending on its
function, requirements and potential commercial impact). However, this
course of action would correspond with the stated intention of the DTI as
contained in the Proposal, and it does seem that the new definition is
effectively to perform the same function as the existing s 20. Accordingly it
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would not make sense to retain both. The problem, however, lies in the fact
that the issues raised are currently catered for by the manner in which s 20 is
framed as well as by s 20(3) and (4), and that when the section is deleted from
the Companies Act the difficulties alluded to may surface. The drafters of the
Bill are no doubt alive to these potential problems, but given the structure
and timing of the amendment process were unable to address them at this
point. The potential confusion seems to have been compounded by the
decision to use a mirror-image definition (albeit an amended one) of the
existing private company to define the new public interest company. It is
unclear why the drafters have adopted this approach, although this may
become apparent in due course. It seems, therefore, at the very least, that a
provision having a similar effect to that of the current s 20 needs to be
enacted in the case of a public interest company in the Final Phase as, until it
is enacted, these uncertainties will persist.
As it seems to be a relatively simple exercise to close the loopholes
occasioned by the drafting of the new definition in due course by utilizing
mechanisms and wording already contained in the current legislation, this
raises a further question in relation to the drafting of the new definition:
whether there is conceptually any substantial difference between the current
public/private company distinction and the public interest/limited interest
distinction which the reformers are attempting to create. So far it appears to
amount to no more than a change of terminology, and it seems that the
differential reporting and audit committee requirements could just as readily
have been linked to private and public companies respectively (and achieved
the same result) without the uncertainties occasioned by the new definitions.
The same principle applies to amendments to the current regime — if the
legislature seeks to do away with the statutory minimum membership for
private companies, for example, it would have been a matter of simply
amending s 20 by deleting s 20(1)(b). However, this perception may once
again be a product of the drafters’ limited mandate at this point of the reform
process, and the rationale for these changes may become apparent as the
process unfolds.
The remainder of the provisions contained in the new s 1(6) dealing with
unrestricted transfers of shares and effective rights of pre-emption are also not
entirely unproblematic. Subsection (6)(e) states that where an effective right
of pre-emption (which is one that operates in favour of all shareholders and
upon every proposed sale of shares to a non-shareholder) is contained in the
articles of a limited interest company, it shall be deemed also to operate, with
the necessary changes, upon the disposal of a beneficial interest in a share of
the company (ie where the beneficial holder of a share disposes of his interest
as opposed to the registered member) and an offer by the company of shares
created in terms of section 75 (ie by the issue of new shares which are offered
to a non-shareholder). Presumably this means that the company cannot issue
new shares to a future shareholder without first offering them to existing
shareholders. It is possible that this may impact unfavourably on black
economic empowerment transactions where these are structured to include
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the issue of new shares to a BEE partner and where some of the shareholders
are more inclined to increase their shareholding than to permit the issue of
shares to the new partner. In circumstances where minority shareholders are
not in favour of a proposed BEE transaction but are outvoted, it thus affords
them a further opportunity to stymie the transaction (provided they have the
financial means to do so) by purchasing any new shares in terms of this
expanded pre-emptive right. Also, where a beneficial holder disposes of his
interest and this is subject to a right of pre-emption, it is not clear how this
provision is to be enforced where the company and other shareholders are
not aware of or alerted to the change in ownership of the beneficial interest.
Whilst this should be ascertainable in terms of the existing s 140A of the
Companies Act by virtue of the disclosure requirement in relation to listed
securities, it appears that the relevant provision in the Bill relates specifically
to limited interest companies (read private, unlisted companies) which are
not subject to the disclosure requirements of s 140A.
Amendment of section 38
One of the stated objectives of the Proposal was to investigate the
appropriateness of the international model of a United States-style ‘solvency-
liquidity test’ as opposed to a capital maintenance requirement with an initial
paid-up capital to which South African company law has to date, at least in
part, continued to subscribe. The capital maintenance rule historically
justified the prohibition of share buy-backs, distributions to shareholders out
of capital and financial assistance for buy-backs which, in terms of the
Companies Amendment Act 37 of 1999, were to a large extent repealed and
replaced by the American solvency and liquidity tests referred to above
which made buy-backs and payments to shareholders possible. The
memorandum on the objects of the Corporate Laws Amendment Bill, 2006
states that shareholder diversification is the other primary reason behind the
proposed amendment of s 38.
In its current form s 38 prohibits a company from providing financial
assistance for the purchase of its own shares or those of its holding company.
The rule is aimed at the preservation of the company’s capital in the interest
of creditors and present shareholders. As pointed out in the explanatory
memorandum, the solvency-liquidity test has gained favour over the
preservation of capital as an alternative protection for creditors and
shareholders because it enables a financially strong company to offer
assistance for the purchase of its shares. The proposed amendment to s 38
apparently introduces a further exception (to the limited list already
contained in s 38(2)) in order to facilitate shareholder diversification or
broad-based black economic empowerment. It is an accepted commercial
and legal fact that s 38 has hampered black economic empowerment by
preventing even financially strong companies from offering assistance for the
purchase of shares to potential BEE partners who do not have the requisite
resources to acquire those shares independently. In terms of the proposed
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amendment a company will, according to the explanatory memorandum, be
able to offer assistance under the new provision if it complies with the
solvency test and if its shareholders approve the terms of the transaction by
passing a special resolution.
The amendment of s 38 provides for the insertion after the existing subsec
(2) of a new subsec (2A), which reads as follows:
‘(2A) Subsection (1) does not prohibit a company from giving financial assistance for the purchase of or
subscription for shares of that company or its holding company, if —
(a) the company’s board is satisfied that —
(i) subsequent to the transaction, the consolidated assets of the company fairly valued will be
more than its consolidated liabilities; and
(ii) subsequent to providing the assistance, and for the duration of the transaction, the company
will be able to pay its debts as they become due in the ordinary course of business; and
(b) the terms upon which the assistance is to be given is sanctioned by a special resolution of its
members.
(2B) For the purposes of paragraph (2A)(a), the directors must consider any contingent liabilities
which may arise to the company, including any contingent liability which may result from giving the
assistance.’
Whilst the objective of the amendment may be laudable, the wording of the
provision is, once again, not devoid of problems. Whether this is attributable
to the intention of the drafters or to an oversight in the drafting process is not
clear at present. The difficulty lies in the fact that the existing prohibition is
far more widely framed than the exception or ‘carve-out’ provided by the
new subsection (2A). The general prohibition provides that:
‘No company shall give, whether directly or indirectly, and whether by means of a loan, guarantee, the
provision of security or otherwise, any financial assistance for the purpose of or in connection with a
purchase or subscription made or to be made by any person of or for any shares of the company, or
where the company is a subsidiary company, of its holding company.’
The possibility of permitting a company to give financial assistance subject
to adequate safeguards for creditors and minority shareholders is not a novel
concept and is especially likely to find favour given the public interest goal of
shareholder diversification, which it facilitates in this instance. However, in
order to serve its original protective purpose, s 38 was drawn in very wide
and general terms. Accordingly, the general prohibition states that financial
assistance includes direct or indirect financial assistance and a loan, guarantee,
the provision of security or financial assistance otherwise provided.
Furthermore, the financial assistance can be made for the purpose of or in
connection with a purchase or subscription of shares or shares of the holding
company. This terminology has been dealt with in various cases and its
application in those instances has not been straightforward. This, together
with the fact that the Appellate Division stressed in Lipschitz NO v UDC
Bank 1979 (1) SA 789 (A) at 798 that ‘there is no latitude for curtailment by
the Courts of its scope in respect of conduct which has been clearly
prohibited’, has led many practitioners to advise their clients that a
contravention of s 38 may very well be less than obvious. Herein lies the rub
of the drafting in this instance. On a plain reading of the proposed
amendment it appears that the scope of the prohibition is wider than the
scope of the permitted exception owing to the fact that different wording
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was used in each case. While direct or indirect financial assistance (including
loans, guarantees, security or financial assistance otherwise provided) for the
purpose of or in connection with a purchase or subscription of shares in a
company or its holding company is patently prohibited, it appears, in terms
of the amendment in the Bill, that only financial assistance for the purchase of
or subscription for shares in a company or its holding company may properly
be excused or permitted.
This gives rise to questions such as whether, for example, financial
assistance which is prohibited in terms of s 38 by virtue of the fact that it
constitutes indirect financial assistance can be cured if, subsequent to the
transaction, the company would be liquid and solvent, and if it is sanctioned
by special resolution. It is not clear at this stage why the drafters of the Bill
opted for different wording or, indeed, whether this was intentional.
If the drafters were desirous of removing the confusion in connection
with the very wide and often ambiguous wording of the s 38 prohibition,
they should surely have taken this opportunity to prune that wording as well.
If not, then the wording in subsec (2A) should logically follow the wording
in the general prohibition verbatim if it is intended to provide an exception
to all forms of prohibited financial assistance provided that the subsequent
requirements of solvency, liquidity and approval by the shareholders by
means of a special resolution are met. This puzzling discrepancy, which it
seems may not have been intended, may confuse the public and, in addition,
have the unintended effect of limiting the potential curative nature of the
exception which the legislature has seen fit to provide. If one has regard to
the spirit of the Lipschitz judgment (supra), it is presumably equally true to say
that there should be no latitude for extension by the court of the scope of an
exception in respect of conduct which has clearly been accepted as
permissible. This anomaly is readily rectifiable if it does not correctly reflect
the intention of the drafters, but if this is the case its very existence is
troubling. While it may have resulted from the urgency of the drafting
process in relation to this particular amendment, it should be clarified or
rectified in the Final Phase.
Another feature of the intended amendment of s 38 that merits further
consideration, but is not specifically alluded to in the explanatory memoran-
dum, is the requirement that the board of directors of the company should be
satisfied that subsequent to the transaction the company will meet the
solvency and liquidity tests. The other sections in the Companies Act which
operate on the basis of solvency and liquidity principles, namely ss 85 and 90,
use the wording ‘[a] company shall not make any payment in whatever form
. . . if there are reasonable grounds for believing that . . .’ (see ss 85(4) and
90(2)). It is not clear why the drafters of the Bill have deviated from the
established wording in connection with these tests and what will be made of
this in practice. Presumably the interpretation of the phrase ‘company’s
board is satisfied’ must recognize some objective component. It would
appear that the satisfaction of the board constitutes an inherently subjective
element, but (presumably) such satisfaction should be objectively justifiable.
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Once again there is no mention of why the drafters have elected to use
different wording from that contained in ss 85 and 90, if in fact they elected
to deviate at all and it is not merely a drafting oversight. If this is not the case,
one would expect the change to be addressed in the memorandum at least to
some extent. Perhaps the drafters will take the opportunity in the Final Phase
to do so.
Section 228
We are informed by the explanatory memorandum that the changes to s 228
are principally aimed at the protection of minority shareholders. In the past
the provisions of s 228 have been misused to the detriment of minority
shareholders on two fronts. First, the section has been used as a mechanism
for effecting a takeover of a target company as an alternative to the existing
section 440K of the Companies Act, which has more stringent requirements.
In its current form s 228 allows directors to dispose of the whole or
substantially the whole of the business or the whole or the greater part of the
assets of a company with the approval of a general meeting of the company,
ie in terms of an ordinary resolution. The proposed amendment has the
effect that such a disposal will henceforth require a special resolution,
resulting in greater protection for minority shareholders. In addition, the
words ‘the whole or substantially the whole’ have in the past been liberally
interpreted in relation to the disposal of a business undertaking in order to
avoid the application of s 228. For this reason the more objective test already
used in respect of assets, namely ‘the whole or the greater part’, will also
apply to the disposal of the business undertaking.
The second instance of misuse relates to the fact that currently, because the
Securities Regulation Code on Takeovers and Mergers applies only to public
companies and private companies that have more than ten beneficial
shareholders, a s 228 disposal which takes place in relation to a wholly-
owned subsidiary does not technically fall within the jurisdiction of the
Securities Regulation Panel (SRP) no matter how significant the disposal is
in terms of value in relation to the group and thus the interest of the minority
shareholders in the holding company as a whole. The effect of this is that
minority shareholders in the holding company do not enjoy the protection
of the SRP in these cases. To cure this defect a further amendment in the
new section provides that if, in relation to the consolidated financial
statements of a holding company, a disposal by any of its subsidiaries would
constitute a disposal by the holding company (in the sense that it constitutes
the disposal of the whole or the greater part of the undertaking or assets of
the company), such a disposal requires a special resolution by the members of
the holding company and subsecs (1) to (4) (ie the provisions requiring a
special resolution and the provision stating that the requirements of s 228 are
in addition to those of the SRP) will also apply.
I am not convinced that the amendment has achieved its stated objective
as regards protection of minority shareholders by the SRP where a s 228
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disposal takes place in a company group context. The involvement of the
SRP at the subsidiary level requires two things: that an ‘affected transaction’
as defined in s 440A of the Companies Act (which specifically includes a
disposal as contemplated in s 228) will take place and that the entity or
entities involved are subject to the jurisdiction of the SRP by virtue of their
nature and the number of shareholders. The amendments in the Bill do not,
it seems, put paid to the argument that the subsidiary (and thus the
transaction) is not subject to SRP jurisdiction or approval where the
subsidiary is a private company with less than ten beneficial shareholders,
because it does not fall under the SRP’s jurisdiction. The amendment does,
in these circumstances, give the shareholders of the holding company the
additional protection that a special resolution is required at the holding
company level if the effect of the disposal in the subsidiary in relation to the
consolidated financial statements of the holding company is that it constitutes
the disposal of the whole or the greater part of the undertaking or assets of
the company. The question that arises is whether this actually means that the
disposal is a s 228 disposal at the level of a holding company also. I would
argue that this is not the case. There is only one disposal, and that disposal is
taking place at the subsidiary level; the fact that the legislature has introduced
a group valuation mechanism of the disposal by having regard to the
consolidated financial statements and attached legal consequences (namely
the special resolution requirement) does not, legally speaking, make it a
second s 228 disposal within the group context. If this is so, it means that the
minority shareholders of the group company (which may now meet the
SRP’s jurisdictional requirement of a private company having more than ten
beneficial shareholders) still do not enjoy the protection of the SRP because
no ‘affected transaction’ (ie no s 228 disposal) has taken place in that
company.
Amending s 228 also presented the legislature with an ideal opportunity to
put paid to the problems arising out of the interaction between the
protection provided to shareholders by the section and the Turquand rule.
This dichotomy came to the fore in Levy & others v Zalrut Investments (Pty)
Ltd 1986 (4) SA 479 (W) and in Farren v Sun Service SA Photo Trip Management
(Pty) Ltd 2004 (2) SA 146 (C). In the Levy case the defendant company had
granted to the plaintiffs an option to purchase property. The defendant
ultimately refused to grant transfer and, in an action instituted by the
plaintiffs to compel it to do so, pleaded that the granting of the option
amounted to a disposal of the whole or substantially the whole of the
defendant’s undertaking, alternatively, of the whole or the greater part of it
assets as contemplated by s 228, and that the requisite consent of the majority
of the shareholders had not been obtained. The plaintiffs replicated, alleging
that the defendant, on the facts, was estopped from relying on the absence of
the approval. The defendant applied for the striking out of, alternatively
excepted to, this replication on the basis that it did not found an estoppel.
Examining the question whether unanimous consent of the members of the
company to the granting of the option was sufficient to avoid the provisions
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of s 228, the court held that the intention of the legislature in enacting the
provision was to limit the powers of the directors; that it was clearly designed
for the benefit of shareholders; and that the unanimous consent had the same
effect and validity as the approval of such transactions by a general meeting
(at 485F). The court held further that there was no question that the disposal
was in fact intra vires the company and could not be considered illegal, void
and unenforceable (at 486–7). Accordingly, the plaintiffs were entitled to
raise estoppel in the circumstances.
Similarly, in the Farren case (supra) the applicant and the respondent
concluded a written agreement of sale in respect of the respondent’s
immovable property. Two weeks later the respondent purportedly cancelled
the agreement. The applicant brought an application for specific perfor-
mance in order to pass transfer of the property. The respondent raised various
defences to the application, inter alia, that the agreement did not bind the
respondent and was not a valid agreement because the approval of the
respondent’s shareholders to the deed of sale had not been obtained in
accordance with the provisions of s 228 of the Companies Act. It was
common cause that the property in question was the only asset of the
company, and the transaction therefore qualified as a disposal which fell
within the parameters of s 228. The Turquand rule, generally expressed by
saying that a person dealing with the company in good faith is entitled to
assume that all internal formalities or acts of management have been duly
performed and carried out by the company, would normally protect the third
party contracting with the company. The question in this case was whether
the respondent could be ordered to pass transfer of the property in the
absence of the resolution prescribed by s 228. Cleaver J found that it was
common cause that the approval of the shareholders of the respondent in
general meeting had not been obtained as required, and that it was clear that
the mere fact that the agreement had not been authorized or approved by the
shareholders did not make it invalid or void (para 11). This had to be so
because s 228(2) made provision for the subsequent ratification of an
agreement by the shareholders. It was held further that the agreement had no
legal effect but that it could be cured by subsequent ratification by the
shareholders in general meeting, and if it were accepted that the objective of
the legislature was to protect the shareholders then that intention should be
given effect to (para 14). The judge opined that it could not have been the
intention of the legislature to curb the authority of directors well knowing
that the Turquand rule would effectively neutralize the provisions of s 228
and that, for reasons which the legislature considered sound, it was decided
that the provisions in question should be embodied in the statute thus giving
them far more weight (paras 14–15). Accordingly the court held that the
Turquand rule does not apply in these circumstances, and dismissed the
application for specific performance.
Given that both of these judgments were based on, amongst other things,
an interpretation of the intention of the legislature in drafting the original
version of s 228, and that the decision ultimately reached by the court in
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Farren (supra) is still a controversial one which has been criticized by various
academic writers, this was an opportune time for the drafters of the Bill to
settle the uncertainty once and for all, and it is a pity that they did not make
use of this opportunity. However, I would point out that the aforesaid
problem will be ameliorated (or further compounded, depending on one’s
view) by the fact that the amended s 228 now requires a special resolution by
the company to effect a transaction which will qualify as a s 228 disposal. By
way of explanation, in circumstances where the special resolution is passed
prior to the entering into of the agreement regulating the s 228 disposal, a
copy of that special resolution must in terms of s 200(3) of the Companies
Act be embodied in or annexed to every copy of the articles issued after the
registration of the resolution. Section 9 of the Act provides that any person
may, on payment of the prescribed fee, inspect the documents lodged under
the Act with the Registrar of Companies. It appears, then, that this public
access to a special resolution authorizing a disposal in terms of s 228 will, in
terms of the doctrine of constructive notice, mean that a prospective
purchaser will be deemed to have knowledge of the special resolution where
it has been passed; but of course this would then present no problem, as the
disposal will have been properly authorized. If, however, there is no special
resolution on file, the question arises whether the third party would be
deemed to have knowledge of this fact (in terms of the doctrine of
constructive notice) and, if so, whether this would mean that he is no longer
bona fide and that the possible application of the Turquand rule therefore falls
away altogether. One could possibly argue not, because the Bill permits a
company to ratify a disposal as provided in s 228(2) and thus it may, in due
course, pass a ratifying resolution; but the further question which then arises
is whether the absence of a resolution at the time of the transaction places
some obligation on a bona fide third party to make enquiries from the
company in this regard, failing which he will no longer be regarded as bona
fide. Alternatively, given the public nature of a special resolution, does the
act of passing that resolution (or not, as the case may be) as opposed to an
ordinary resolution cease to be an internal formality and accordingly negate
the possible application of the Turquand rule entirely? If one does not apply
the reasoning set out above, in circumstances where a ratifying special
resolution is to be passed (but this never takes place) the problem with the
Turquand rule evidenced by the judgment in Farren (supra) will, of course,
persist. The upshot of the matter is that, at the very least, the amendment
does not satisfactorily resolve the current legal uncertainty and may yet create
even more problems in its application.
Other assorted issues
The Bill contains a host of other amendments relating inter alia to financial
reporting, the appointment of auditors and audit committees (which drew
much media attention owing to public and professional uncertainty caused
by imprecise drafting, but which should be clarified in the Corporate Laws
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Amendment Act), the limitation of liability of various office-bearers, making
provision for the use of electronic aids in furnishing company and close
corporation information, extending the Minister’s powers of delegation,
providing for methods of giving notice in relation to companies and close
corporations, the elimination of certain formalities regarding the memoran-
dum and articles, the restoration of a company or close corporation which
has been deregistered in certain circumstances, matters to be stated in a
prospectus and the disclosure of information. However the effects of most of
these amendments are less far-reaching and less complex than the specific
provisions discussed above, and it is not clear in all instances why these
specific amendments qualified as deserving of urgent interim legislative
attention and why other pivotal amendments contained in the Bill (such as
the definitions of the different types of companies) were not afforded more
comprehensive drafting consideration.
CONCLUSION
On a closer analysis of some of the fundamental and significant amendments
contained in the Bill it becomes apparent that the constraints imposed upon
the drafters and the drafting process by dividing the reform of company law
into two distinct phases, whilst it may have been unavoidable, has caused
certain problems. Some amendments, such as the distinction between public
interest and limited interest companies, have not been carried out in
sufficient detail, thereby creating uncertainty, or do not disclose enough of
the underlying rationale at this stage of the drafting process to convince that
they are required at all. Where the same results could have been achieved
without the concomitant uncertainty which stems from such a substantial
redrafting (and the inevitable omission of aspects which can only be properly
addressed in the Final Phase), this would obviously have been the more
desirable route to follow. Other amendments which are conceptually sound
and beneficial, such as those contained in ss 38 and 228, appear to have been
loosely drafted. Either this, or the drafters’ intentions are more far-reaching
and complex than appears from their stated intentions in the Proposal and the
explanatory memorandum to the Bill, in which case they could have avoided
any uncertainty by explaining their reasoning and motives more thoroughly.
Perhaps the need for some of the sweeping changes (such as the new
definitions) and their unavoidable nature will be revealed as the reform
process unfolds, and puzzling aspects of certain amendments (such as the
wording of s 38) may turn out to be attributable to considered policies which
will also be revealed in due course. The Proposal frequently makes mention
of the fact that comprehensive corporate law reform is long overdue. While
this may be true, the reform process should obviously not be unduly
hastened by public or political pressure to the ultimate detriment of legal
certainty and the making of good law.
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